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SHUTTLE LESSONS LEARNED – TOXICOLOGY 
 
[00:00:00.506] 
( Silence ) 
 
[00:00:05.046] 
>> Okay. I've been asked to 
talk about the toxicology 
 
[00:00:08.346] 
and the lessons we've 
learned from the Shuttle. 
 
[00:00:11.816] 
My own experience has gone from 
about 1989 to the present, 2010. 
 
[00:00:16.976] 
I divided this into 
four segments. 
 
[00:00:19.166] 
The first segment is gonna deal 
with dust in the space vehicle 
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[00:00:22.736] 
and how we've managed 
that and learned about it 
 
[00:00:24.686] 
over the decades or so 
that we've studied it. 
 
[00:00:27.616] 
The next segment will 
be archival samples, 
 
[00:00:30.716] 
that is methods that we 
have used and developed 
 
[00:00:33.446] 
to sample the air during a 
flight, bring back the samples 
 
[00:00:36.616] 
and analyze them after 
the mission is over. 
 
[00:00:39.986] 
This has clear limitations 
if you're trying to diagnose 
 
[00:00:42.536] 
and troubleshoot a 
problem to get data 
 
[00:00:46.236] 
that are three or 
four months old. 
 
[00:00:48.276] 
It's just not very useful. 
 
[00:00:50.986] 
Then I'll go on to talk about 
real time on-board analyzers 
 
[00:00:54.136] 
that give us a lot of capability 
in terms of monitoring 
 
[00:00:56.626] 
for combustion products and some 
of the lead end to being able 
 [00:01:01.266] 
to monitor volatile 
organics on the station 
 
[00:01:04.446] 
where we've developed a lot 
 
[00:01:05.376] 
of the techniques improving 
them on the Shuttle. 
 
[00:01:08.006] 
And then finally, I'll pick 
up some bits and pieces 
 
[00:01:10.326] 
that don't have anything to do 
with hardware but have to do 
 
[00:01:13.356] 
with other lessons we've learned 
about setting limits and dealing 
 
[00:01:17.046] 
with ground-based issues that 
pertain to toxicology and so on. 
 
[00:01:20.976] 
So, let me start off with dust. 
 
[00:01:23.636] 
If you were to take a sample 
of dust from the Shuttle, 
 
[00:01:30.516] 
from the vacuum cleaner, it 
would look something like this. 
 
[00:01:34.786] 
You'll see in here a 
lot of fiber particles. 
 
[00:01:36.926] 
There are clearly 
some food particles. 
 
[00:01:39.106] 
If you were to look closer, 
 
[00:01:40.396] 
there would be a few 
metal shavings and so on. 
 
[00:01:42.856] 
And this particular sample was 
taken in order to determine 
 
[00:01:46.706] 
if rat food bar pellets 
 
[00:01:49.946] 
or pieces were getting 
out into the cabin. 
 
[00:01:51.926] 
This was during an experiment 
 
[00:01:53.136] 
when there was a 
rat habitat onboard. 
 
[00:01:55.816] 
And we're actually able 
to discern a few particles 
 [00:01:58.656] 
that looked like rat 
food and pulled them 
 
[00:02:02.076] 
out from the mess 
I just showed you. 
 
[00:02:05.476] 
But to look like a rat 
food bar is not enough. 
 
[00:02:08.026] 
And what we did was use 
GC mass spec pyrolysis 
 
[00:02:11.726] 
to identify a spectrum 
for these particles 
 
[00:02:14.946] 
and for rat food bar 
material that we knew about. 
 
[00:02:18.806] 
And we're able to identify 
with high confidence 
 
[00:02:21.466] 
that in fact the pellets 
 
[00:02:23.206] 
from the rat food 
bar were getting out. 
 
[00:02:25.736] 
That was no big deal 
because there weren't 
 
[00:02:28.126] 
that many pellets actually. 
 
[00:02:30.846] 
There was a concern early on 
in the '80s about the particles 
 
[00:02:35.956] 
in the Shuttle and 
particularly having to do 
 [00:02:39.206] 
with the respirable 
particles which are those 
 
[00:02:41.136] 
that are less than 5 microns. 
 
[00:02:45.346] 
Then Lou and some other experts 
at the University of Minnesota 
 
[00:02:49.126] 
and some monitors here at 
JSC got a flight together 
 
[00:02:52.946] 
and there were two 
instruments on that flight. 
 
[00:02:54.486] 
One was the cascade impactor 
 
[00:02:56.366] 
which would partition 
the particles according 
 
[00:02:58.586] 
to their size and 
another one was 
 
[00:03:00.416] 
to measure the wall 
concentrations. 
 
[00:03:02.636] 
This is the instrument 
that was used 
 
[00:03:04.046] 
to measure the wall 
concentrations 
 
[00:03:06.126] 
and follow them overtime. 
 
[00:03:08.036] 
The experiment was 
very successful 
 
[00:03:09.856] 
from the very beginning and 
gave us two good reassurances 
 
[00:03:13.976] 
about dust particles. 
 
[00:03:15.236] 
First of all, the concentration 
in the air was not so high 
 
[00:03:18.486] 
that it would be a threat to 
crew health, and in addition, 
 
[00:03:21.486] 
the concentration 
 
[00:03:22.506] 
in the respirable size was well 
below any standards we would set 
 
[00:03:26.696] 
for the Shuttle. 
 
[00:03:28.516] 
( Pause ) 
 
[00:03:35.246] 
>> Eventually, the large 
floating particles, 
 
[00:03:38.446] 
they came a nuisance 
to the crew. 
 
[00:03:40.206] 
And so in the mid late '90s, 
 
[00:03:42.566] 
something called the orbiter 
cabin air cleaner was developed. 
 
[00:03:46.106] 
This was a large unit 
that fit in the opening 
 
[00:03:48.226] 
between the mid-deck 
and the flight deck. 
 [00:03:52.506] 
It had the advantage that 
yes indeed it cleaned 
 
[00:03:54.796] 
out the large particles 
but it was noisy 
 
[00:03:58.056] 
and the crew didn't always 
welcomed its presence, 
 
[00:04:01.206] 
but it did get rid of 
the dust such as it was. 
 
[00:04:05.486] 
Now, I wanna go on 
and talk a little bit 
 
[00:04:07.046] 
about archival samplers. 
 
[00:04:08.666] 
These are samplers that are 
used on orbit by the crew 
 
[00:04:12.086] 
and we bring back samples 
and analyze them on orbit. 
 
[00:04:15.436] 
In 1985, the toxicology 
group patented this device 
 
[00:04:19.086] 
which we call the solid 
sorbent air sampler. 
 
[00:04:22.226] 
[00:04:26.546] 
This was to enable 
the crew to take 
 
[00:04:28.176] 
up to 7 samples during a mission 
and they had to turn this dial 
 
[00:04:33.746] 
to select which sampler they 
wanted to load the air sample 
 
[00:04:37.736] 
onto and then 8 was 
a parking position, 
 
[00:04:40.296] 
they could use that 
for a sample. 
 
[00:04:42.286] 
The way this thing function 
was this - there was a holder 
 
[00:04:48.616] 
for batteries right 
here, two B-size cells. 
 
[00:04:53.386] 
There was a pump here, something 
like what you might have 
 
[00:04:56.096] 
in an aquarium, and 
there were tiny tubings 
 
[00:04:58.896] 
that would run the gas around 
and deposit the contaminants 
 
[00:05:05.026] 
in these long tubes that were 
filled with absorbent material. 
 
[00:05:08.136] 
This device was brought 
back into the lab 
 
[00:05:12.046] 
and the hot air was 
run through these tubes 
 
[00:05:14.746] 
to desorb the pollutants 
and they were put 
 
[00:05:17.736] 
into a GC mass spectrometer. 
 
[00:05:20.966] 
[00:05:22.166] 
Problems with this were 
primarily concerning the pump. 
 
[00:05:25.616] 
We measured the flow before and 
after flight, and oftentimes, 
 
[00:05:30.296] 
the flows didn't 
match very well. 
 
[00:05:33.076] 
We, for a while, thought 
that maybe that was due 
 
[00:05:36.596] 
to obstruction getting into 
these tubes when we drew air in 
 
[00:05:39.966] 
but we had a very good 
filter over the end of it. 
 
[00:05:43.366] 
And eventually, we concluded 
 
[00:05:44.786] 
that the way we were actually 
doing the measurements 
 
[00:05:46.616] 
in the lab was not sufficiently 
consistent, and so we worked 
 
[00:05:50.246] 
that over and got 
this to go very well. 
 
[00:05:53.146] 
We did fly this for 
a number of times 
 
[00:05:55.326] 
on the Shuttle-Mir Program. 
 
[00:05:57.266] 
One adaptation we made for 
Mir was that there were a lot 
 [00:06:01.546] 
of floating dust 
particles in Mir. 
 
[00:06:04.296] 
And what also would later appear 
to us to be liquids and food 
 
[00:06:08.446] 
and so on, and often the inlet 
would get plugged up on Mir. 
 
[00:06:13.216] 
And so what we devised 
was actually an inlet 
 
[00:06:15.606] 
with 5 ways in. 
 
[00:06:16.956] 
If you look at this, there 
are the 4 ways around 
 
[00:06:19.786] 
and then the one on the in. 
 
[00:06:21.336] 
This gave us 4 more ways for 
air to get into the inlet 
 
[00:06:26.456] 
as compared to just one 
of these round holes. 
 
[00:06:28.706] 
And this never failed. 
 
[00:06:29.786] 
We never had a plug-up 
problem after that. 
 
[00:06:33.716] 
I might point out that this unit 
is actually a fairly famous unit 
 
[00:06:40.926] 
because it was the one that 
Dr. Jerry Linenger used 
 
[00:06:43.596] 
after the SFOG fire. 
 
[00:06:45.566] 
And if you could look 
very closely on this, 
 
[00:06:47.386] 
he notes where the 
fire occurred. 
 
[00:06:49.336] 
We'd had two routine 
samples before the fire 
 
[00:06:52.616] 
and then he notes here 
that the fire occurred. 
 
[00:06:54.756] 
And he used it on a very 
carefully worked out sequence, 
 
[00:06:58.246] 
not like we've planned, 
but very smartly to show 
 
[00:07:02.016] 
that pollution actually 
cleared from the air 
 
[00:07:03.816] 
in about a day and a half. 
 
[00:07:05.506] 
So, in a certain sense, this 
is a historic solid sorbent 
 
[00:07:08.846] 
air sampler. 
 
[00:07:09.676] 
(Noise) That was good. 
 
[00:07:15.006] 
We thought we would 
build something better. 
 
[00:07:17.046] 
So, we built a larger version 
of this shown in this picture. 
 
[00:07:24.076] 
This had 16 tubes and 
they were longer tubes 
 
[00:07:28.026] 
and we have them set so 
that we could take them 
 
[00:07:29.706] 
out more carefully and desorb 
them better than we could 
 
[00:07:33.456] 
in the solid sorbent 
air sampler. 
 
[00:07:35.576] 
We also had this set 
up with a programmer 
 
[00:07:37.816] 
so that the whole unit 
could be programmed 
 [00:07:40.006] 
to automatically take samples 
once the unit got on orbit. 
 
[00:07:44.346] 
It turned out it was too large 
 
[00:07:45.746] 
and too cumbersome 
to actually fly. 
 
[00:07:47.906] 
Test in the lab indicated 
it was pretty good, 
 
[00:07:50.136] 
but we learned a couple lessons. 
 
[00:07:52.816] 
One, you can't fly really 
big things no matter how much 
 
[00:07:56.026] 
you want. 
 [00:07:57.126] 
And we knew that 
krypton was important 
 
[00:08:01.036] 
but this did not have 
enough gain in terms 
 
[00:08:03.386] 
of not using krypton to 
actually get it flown. 
 
[00:08:07.876] 
The other goal of 
flying things on orbit is 
 
[00:08:11.846] 
to get things smaller. 
 
[00:08:13.936] 
There were thin ground 
base testing on a lot 
 
[00:08:15.956] 
of labs had used something 
we call the archival 
 
[00:08:19.026] 
organic sampler. 
 
[00:08:20.066] 
We flew a cluster of these, and 
the idea with these things is 
 
[00:08:25.216] 
that you would not 
need the pump. 
 
[00:08:26.686] 
Remember I said the pump 
 
[00:08:27.986] 
in the solid sorbent air sampler 
was a little bit of a problem. 
 
[00:08:31.526] 
That these would actually 
capture sample by diffusion 
 
[00:08:35.996] 
through a very tiny hole that 
I think probably is difficult 
 
[00:08:38.956] 
to see that there's a tiny hole 
right in the middle of this. 
 
[00:08:41.926] 
And the idea is that pollutants 
would diffuse across this 
 
[00:08:44.626] 
into a trapping resin below it 
 
[00:08:47.276] 
and then the crew would 
simply see what back up 
 
[00:08:50.066] 
and we would get it back in lab 
 
[00:08:51.426] 
and analyze the pollutants 
in the resin. 
 [00:08:53.906] 
Two problems with this, one, 
they weren't sensitive enough 
 
[00:08:56.616] 
to capture the level 
 
[00:08:57.576] 
of pollutants we 
would see on Shuttle. 
 
[00:08:59.496] 
And two, things like this right 
here actually release enough 
 
[00:09:02.976] 
pollutants that it 
contaminated the trapping resin. 
 
[00:09:07.206] 
And so we tried to use 
these but they didn't work. 
 
[00:09:11.426] 
Now, one last sorbent effort 
was conducted after Columbia. 
 
[00:09:19.366] 
Shuttle had been one of the main 
ways we were getting samples 
 
[00:09:21.966] 
down from the station, but 
when Columbia occurred, 
 
[00:09:26.166] 
the Columbia accident, we 
had to very quickly get away 
 
[00:09:28.986] 
to bring back samples. 
 
[00:09:30.866] 
Samples had been coming back 
in this grab sample canister 
 
[00:09:34.346] 
that I'll talk about 
in a minute, 
 [00:09:35.546] 
but we needed a much smaller way 
 
[00:09:37.186] 
that we can get back 
samples on Soyuz. 
 
[00:09:39.866] 
So, in a period of about a month 
or two, we went from concept 
 
[00:09:44.066] 
to ready to fly with something 
we call the archival released 
 
[00:09:49.446] 
with just dualsorbent samplers. 
 
[00:09:52.356] 
We call them dualsorbents 
because of instead of like this 
 
[00:09:55.856] 
with one sorbent material, 
 [00:09:57.006] 
we actually had two 
sorbents in here. 
 
[00:09:59.426] 
We had a pump that would fly 
and this would go back and forth 
 
[00:10:02.876] 
and the crew would pull 
the ends off of these 
 
[00:10:05.326] 
and aspirate the sample through 
 
[00:10:07.136] 
and then you can see 
the heat marks here. 
 
[00:10:08.086] 
>> Once these are brought 
back, the tubes are heated, 
 
[00:10:11.376] 
this sample is desorbed 
and analyzed in the lab. 
 
[00:10:14.676] 
This is very much like 
a single component 
 
[00:10:17.276] 
of the solid sorbent air sample 
 
[00:10:19.396] 
that I showed you 
the inside of here. 
 
[00:10:22.336] 
We learned a lesson here. 
 
[00:10:26.286] 
We really did a crash 
program to get these 
 
[00:10:28.816] 
on as I said in a month or two. 
 
[00:10:30.146] 
And the recoveries from 
these were very good 
 
[00:10:32.626] 
if the samples were more 
than about a month old. 
 
[00:10:35.506] 
But oftentimes on Station, 
we wouldn't get samples back 
 
[00:10:38.156] 
until they were three 
or four months old, 
 
[00:10:40.196] 
and a lot of the volatile 
organic polar compounds 
 
[00:10:43.636] 
declined rapidly. 
 
[00:10:44.916] 
We never did figure 
out where they went, 
 [00:10:47.446] 
we developed correction 
factors for those pollutants. 
 
[00:10:51.626] 
But because of that, 
it made measurements 
 
[00:10:53.696] 
that much more uncertain, and 
we eventually abandoned this. 
 
[00:10:57.136] 
It's not sufficiently accurate. 
 
[00:11:00.706] 
[00:11:05.176] 
Now, I wanna move on to 
a new kind of sampler. 
 
[00:11:07.726] 
These samplers didn't 
require a sorbent that as 
 
[00:11:12.836] 
such to capture the sample. 
 
[00:11:15.376] 
In the 1980s, we were using 
something we affectionately 
 
[00:11:18.056] 
called the "sausage." 
 
[00:11:20.026] 
And this would-- we 
would evacuate the inside 
 
[00:11:22.816] 
of this canister here 
and the crew member 
 
[00:11:25.636] 
to get a sample would remove 
the dust cap, most of the time, 
 
[00:11:31.306] 
open this valve, and the sample 
would be aspirated in here. 
 [00:11:36.006] 
We learned a few things. 
 
[00:11:37.606] 
One is that the crew members 
like to unscrew this too far, 
 
[00:11:41.316] 
hence we added this little arm 
so that that's impossible to do. 
 
[00:11:45.866] 
The other problem that we never 
really solved because we have 
 
[00:11:48.476] 
to have a dust cap here, is 
 
[00:11:50.646] 
that occasionally the 
crew member would forget 
 
[00:11:52.516] 
to take the dust cap off and 
we could tell very quickly 
 
[00:11:55.256] 
that no sample was acquired 
because there are pollutants 
 
[00:11:57.996] 
on the orbit that are very 
characteristic of what you want 
 
[00:12:00.666] 
to see from a spacecraft 
such as methane. 
 
[00:12:03.066] 
If you didn't see any 
methane, it was a bad sample. 
 
[00:12:06.436] 
[00:12:09.456] 
These have an okay volume to 
surface area configuration. 
 
[00:12:16.166] 
But a sphere actually 
gives you better volume 
 
[00:12:18.726] 
to surface area configuration. 
 
[00:12:20.816] 
And one of the problems 
with the sausage was 
 
[00:12:23.816] 
that we were afraid some 
 
[00:12:25.946] 
of the pollutants were 
actually adhering to the walls 
 
[00:12:29.206] 
of the canister and 
we couldn't see them. 
 
[00:12:31.866] 
So we started using these 
brown canisters in the 1990s. 
 
[00:12:37.856] 
And you could see again, 
here's the dust cap, 
 
[00:12:39.706] 
this particular version 
doesn't have the arm 
 
[00:12:41.756] 
to prevent this from coming off. 
 
[00:12:44.256] 
The other issue that this 
solved was that this-- 
 
[00:12:46.816] 
there's a metal to 
metal contact in here. 
 
[00:12:49.046] 
And if any dust does get in here 
when the sample is acquired, 
 
[00:12:52.956] 
then when the crew member 
goes to seek this valve back, 
 [00:12:56.566] 
[00:12:58.886] 
the dust-- piece of dust 
gets trapped in there 
 
[00:13:02.266] 
and occasionally we will 
lose a sample that way. 
 
[00:13:05.126] 
The other thing is the metal to 
metal valve actually got ruined 
 
[00:13:08.046] 
from time to time because 
the crew members would 
 
[00:13:10.076] 
over tighten the shut valve. 
 
[00:13:13.646] 
So now you can see 
there's a clutch here. 
 
[00:13:15.416] 
And this is very much 
like your gas cap 
 
[00:13:17.826] 
if you've got a relatively 
moderate car. 
 
[00:13:19.956] 
You can only tighten it so far 
 
[00:13:22.136] 
and then it clicks 
and you're done. 
 
[00:13:24.496] 
These still are in service. 
 
[00:13:25.726] 
We use these on the 
International Station 
 
[00:13:27.796] 
and we use this on Shuttle now 
 
[00:13:29.746] 
to bring back an 
end-of-mission sample. 
 
[00:13:32.526] 
[00:13:36.556] 
We did try for a period of 
time to heat the walls of these 
 
[00:13:40.416] 
to dry the can-- some of the 
pollutants that may have gotten 
 
[00:13:43.416] 
on the interior walls but 
that brought in a host 
 
[00:13:46.506] 
of other problems, and so we 
eventually abandoned the idea 
 
[00:13:49.446] 
of heating the walls 
of these things. 
 
[00:13:52.536] 
Now, I wanna step 
back just a second. 
 
[00:13:54.266] 
This is another sorbent method 
that came along in the 1990s. 
 
[00:13:58.356] 
One of the compounds that sticks 
to the walls of these things 
 
[00:14:00.846] 
that is very difficult to 
quantify is formaldehyde. 
 
[00:14:03.686] 
But formaldehyde is an important 
component of offgassing 
 
[00:14:06.826] 
and is also released in 
some of the curing processes 
 
[00:14:10.886] 
that are used for 
materials on Shuttle. 
 
[00:14:13.146] 
So we looked around and 
found formaldehyde badges. 
 
[00:14:17.206] 
This is very inexpensive. 
 
[00:14:18.496] 
They are 20 dollars even now. 
 
[00:14:20.346] 
And the way this work is the 
crew member pulls off this tab 
 
[00:14:24.676] 
to start the process. 
 
[00:14:26.606] 
And this bisulfide material 
in here traps formaldehyde 
 
[00:14:31.616] 
as it passes by in 
a flow stream. 
 
[00:14:34.086] 
After 24 hours, the crew 
member covers the badge, 
 
[00:14:38.006] 
and it's brought 
back for analysis 
 
[00:14:39.846] 
by spectrophotometry in the lab. 
 
[00:14:42.596] 
Problems with these badges 
are that they are small 
 
[00:14:45.326] 
and they sometimes get lost. 
 
[00:14:46.626] 
They've found these badges 
that have been opened for weeks 
 
[00:14:50.006] 
or even months, tucked in 
somewhere in the station. 
 
[00:14:55.206] 
They-- we push the limit of 
detection with these badges also 
 
[00:14:59.116] 
so that we use them in pairs 
for more accurate readings. 
 
[00:15:02.336] 
But they still are 
used on Space Station. 
 
[00:15:04.716] 
We did use them for a 
period of time for example 
 
[00:15:07.096] 
in the extended duration 
orbiter program of the Shuttle 
 
[00:15:10.386] 
and we found that formaldehyde 
was not a problem then 
 
[00:15:12.706] 
on Shuttle at least within the 
limits that we had set then. 
 
[00:15:20.916] 
We did have an experience 
with these. 
 
[00:15:22.616] 
We were using these in a 
Lunar-Mars Life Support Test 
 
[00:15:27.006] 
on the ground and a lot of 
formaldehyde was being released 
 
[00:15:31.256] 
as it turned out from some of 
the acoustic materials and some 
 
[00:15:34.586] 
of the murals that 
were put in there 
 
[00:15:36.286] 
to keep the crew entertained. 
 
[00:15:38.496] 
And these formaldehyde 
badges were used-- 
 
[00:15:41.156] 
being used and were showing that 
formaldehyde was increasing. 
 
[00:15:44.006] 
And one of the crew members 
actually had some problem 
 
[00:15:46.096] 
with respiratory irritation, 
and so the question came up, 
 
[00:15:49.406] 
were these badges 
really accurate. 
 
[00:15:51.346] 
And we used the gold 
standard method that's-- 
 
[00:15:54.356] 
a wet chemistry method which you 
could never use in space to show 
 
[00:15:57.906] 
that in fact these badges were 
given very accurate readings 
 
[00:16:00.896] 
and so we trust them a lot. 
 
[00:16:03.016] 
[00:16:05.406] 
Now, I wanna move 
on from samplers 
 
[00:16:08.456] 
to actual analyzers on orbit. 
 
[00:16:11.286] 
We experienced a 
number of issues 
 
[00:16:15.696] 
that involved small 
combustion events 
 
[00:16:19.376] 
in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. 
 
[00:16:23.836] 
This is a picture from 
STS-28 which flew in 1989. 
 
[00:16:27.986] 
If you look carefully, 
what's happened here is 
 
[00:16:32.216] 
that a wired junction with a 
sleeve of Teflon has pyrolyzed. 
 
[00:16:37.666] 
It was actually out in the or-- 
general space in the Shuttle 
 [00:16:42.396] 
and the crew was very 
aware when this happened 
 
[00:16:44.606] 
because it arched, it sparked. 
 
[00:16:46.476] 
It made a little smoke and it 
definitely got their attention. 
 
[00:16:50.006] 
This and a few other 
events something like this 
 
[00:16:52.306] 
but much less sharp-- much 
more subtle impelled us to try 
 
[00:16:57.656] 
to get some real time onboard 
analysis of combustion products. 
 
[00:17:03.366] 
Another event that 
got our attention was 
 
[00:17:06.106] 
when a motor failed in the 
orbiter refrigerator freezer. 
 
[00:17:09.506] 
This is a picture of that motor. 
 
[00:17:12.366] 
[00:17:13.386] 
And what happened is that 
there was no thermal protect 
 
[00:17:16.416] 
on the motor and the sleeve that 
this thing was driving that went 
 
[00:17:19.936] 
to the fan seized up against its 
sleeve and the motor kept trying 
 
[00:17:24.436] 
to turn the shaft but could not. 
 [00:17:26.126] 
It got hotter and hotter. 
 
[00:17:27.326] 
This is a Delrin case here. 
 
[00:17:30.186] 
And one of the best ways in the 
world to make formaldehyde is 
 
[00:17:33.466] 
for Delrin to be heated. 
 
[00:17:35.586] 
And so this thing made copious 
amounts of formaldehyde. 
 
[00:17:37.956] 
You can see where the plastic 
structure is actually destroyed 
 
[00:17:40.516] 
here and so the electronics 
up here were destroyed. 
 [00:17:45.216] 
This was on STS-40. 
 
[00:17:47.386] 
It's my judgment that the 
mission would have been cut 
 
[00:17:49.466] 
short had the crew not 
had a place to go outside 
 
[00:17:52.526] 
of the module where 
this event occurred 
 
[00:17:55.216] 
to escape the bad 
smell from this. 
 
[00:17:58.966] 
And actually I had this 
thing in my lab for a while. 
 
[00:18:02.096] 
And it-- even through the bags 
that we had in containment, 
 
[00:18:05.096] 
there were a lot of clearly 
small noxious compounds 
 
[00:18:08.346] 
that would get to the bag. 
 
[00:18:10.096] 
So, anyway, in the early '90s, 
there was a lot of impetus 
 
[00:18:13.206] 
to get something up there to 
measure combustion products. 
 
[00:18:19.436] 
Our first attempt to 
that is shown here, 
 
[00:18:22.766] 
we call it the combustion 
products analyser. 
 [00:18:25.616] 
It did 4 compounds. 
 
[00:18:27.506] 
It did hydrogen fluoride, 
hydrogen chloride, 
 
[00:18:30.006] 
hydrogen cyanide, 
and carbon monoxide. 
 
[00:18:33.126] 
We looked at the products 
of combustion or the kind 
 
[00:18:36.186] 
of materials that we 
thought might burn on orbit 
 
[00:18:38.526] 
that would be primarily 
wire insulation 
 
[00:18:41.366] 
and polymeric materials. 
 
[00:18:43.006] 
And that's how we 
selected those 4 compounds. 
 
[00:18:47.716] 
We were under a lot of pressure 
 
[00:18:48.926] 
to get this onboard 
and that was okay. 
 
[00:18:52.316] 
In the early '90s, it was very 
easy to get things funded. 
 
[00:18:56.046] 
I remember going to Clay 
McCullough who's then the GFE 
 
[00:18:59.256] 
manager for the Shuttle and 
saying hey we've got a problem 
 
[00:19:03.076] 
with this combustion 
stuff, we've got an analyser 
 
[00:19:05.326] 
that we think we can fly. 
 
[00:19:07.826] 
His question is how 
much money do you need. 
 
[00:19:10.436] 
We told him. 
 
[00:19:11.036] 
He gave us more than that, 
 
[00:19:13.366] 
and we were flying this 
thing within a few months. 
 
[00:19:15.616] 
No boards, no mess, 
no fluff, go do it. 
 
[00:19:20.766] 
So we flew this. 
 
[00:19:22.076] 
There was a downside, 
it turned out. 
 
[00:19:24.626] 
We asked. We knew the 
carbon monoxide sensor 
 
[00:19:26.936] 
on this thing was 
sensitive to hydrogen. 
 
[00:19:29.606] 
We asked the ECLSS guys, 
the Environmental Control 
 
[00:19:32.116] 
and Life Support guys, is there 
any hydrogen in the Shuttle? 
 
[00:19:35.176] 
No, there's no hydrogen 
in there, he says. 
 
[00:19:37.836] 
Okay, so we're not gonna worry 
 
[00:19:39.656] 
about the hydrogen 
cross sensitivity. 
 
[00:19:41.336] 
So, we flew this baby and 
the carbon monoxide sensor, 
 
[00:19:44.436] 
which is the electrochemical 
sensor 
 
[00:19:45.876] 
like all the others gave 
us a pretty strong reading 
 
[00:19:48.176] 
of carbon monoxide that 
gave us some anxiety. 
 
[00:19:51.206] 
And when we got back and 
looked for hydrogen in this, 
 
[00:19:55.316] 
which we had never looked 
for before in this canister, 
 
[00:19:57.636] 
we discovered that yeah, barely 
there is a lot of hydrogen 
 
[00:20:00.416] 
in the Shuttle that accumulates 
 
[00:20:01.986] 
from human metabolism 
and other processes. 
 
[00:20:05.046] 
>> So we had to correct 
the electrochemical sensor 
 
[00:20:07.156] 
in this thing for the hydrogen 
cross sensitivity while a 
 
[00:20:10.646] 
mission was coming up. 
 
[00:20:11.646] 
And we tried to change 
the bias voltage 
 
[00:20:14.526] 
in the electrochemical sensor 
and we thought we had done that. 
 
[00:20:17.046] 
We did a very quick 
test and it seemed 
 
[00:20:19.836] 
like it was gonna work well. 
 
[00:20:22.726] 
Unfortunately, we picked the 
first flight of that to be one - 
 
[00:20:25.366] 
I think it was STS-35 for 
two data display units. 
 
[00:20:28.656] 
It had a pyrolysis issue. 
 
[00:20:30.466] 
And this instrument gave 
carbon monoxide readings 
 
[00:20:34.436] 
that we will say in 
the interesting level. 
 
[00:20:36.716] 
And it caused a lot 
of the anxiety. 
 
[00:20:38.786] 
And we eventually 
concluded indirectly 
 
[00:20:42.516] 
that it really wasn't 
carbon monoxide. 
 [00:20:44.576] 
There wasn't enough 
of that in the air 
 
[00:20:45.896] 
to set this thing off 
but it was hydrogen. 
 
[00:20:48.446] 
But a lot of attention 
was drawn into this. 
 
[00:20:51.406] 
And I would say a lot 
of negative publicity. 
 
[00:20:54.456] 
If in case I forget 
to say it later, 
 
[00:20:56.246] 
one of the things we've learned 
is if you have an instrument 
 
[00:20:58.956] 
that performs 90 percent of the 
time and it fails 10 percent 
 
[00:21:02.656] 
of the time, they'll 
remember the 10 percent. 
 
[00:21:05.016] 
And if you build a 
subsequent version of it, 
 
[00:21:08.346] 
you want to call it 
by something else. 
 
[00:21:10.326] 
You do not want just 
to call it CSACPII. 
 
[00:21:13.226] 
Lesson learned, good politics. 
 
[00:21:15.246] 
This instrument did perform 
very well incidentally on Mir. 
 
[00:21:19.866] 
Actually, this is one that 
flew on Mir and I know 
 
[00:21:21.796] 
that because it's got 
all the Russian written 
 
[00:21:24.686] 
on the back here. 
 
[00:21:26.456] 
[00:21:28.986] 
A year after the Solid 
Fuel Oxygen Generator Fire 
 
[00:21:32.126] 
that I told you about in 
connection with this device, 
 
[00:21:35.406] 
[00:21:36.456] 
there was a much smaller fire 
 [00:21:39.596] 
that involved the Trace 
Contaminant Control System 
 
[00:21:42.456] 
on Mir. 
 
[00:21:44.056] 
Basically, a filter that had a 
cellulose plate in it was moved 
 
[00:21:47.786] 
into a hot stream prematurely 
and the cellulose plate burned. 
 
[00:21:52.286] 
This caused a little bit 
of smoke in the cabin 
 
[00:21:54.036] 
but nobody thought 
much about it. 
 
[00:21:56.786] 
The crew seemed to be fine. 
 
[00:21:58.466] 
But later that evening 
and the next morning, 
 
[00:22:01.696] 
crew members complained 
of headache and nausea 
 
[00:22:03.776] 
and those symptoms 
are consistent 
 
[00:22:05.196] 
with carbon monoxide poisoning. 
 
[00:22:06.746] 
And it turned out readings 
with this instrument 
 
[00:22:09.506] 
that was still being flown 
 
[00:22:10.396] 
as an experimental instrument 
showed carbon monoxide levels 
 
[00:22:14.756] 
about 500 ppm. 
 
[00:22:16.776] 
And we later confirmed 
that readings 
 
[00:22:19.126] 
of this thing were 
accurate because one 
 
[00:22:20.626] 
of these things was taken 
during the period of time 
 
[00:22:23.006] 
when the carbon monoxide was up. 
 
[00:22:25.666] 
So we learned that this 
instrument really can, 
 
[00:22:27.636] 
with appropriate hydrogen 
correction give us really 
 
[00:22:29.956] 
good readings. 
 
[00:22:32.216] 
The lesson there was 
not only instrumental 
 
[00:22:34.296] 
that is be careful what you 
fly, make sure it's as ready 
 
[00:22:37.446] 
as it can be, and if 
it's an experiment, 
 
[00:22:40.326] 
make sure everybody 
knows it's an experiment 
 
[00:22:42.816] 
and not a ready-to-go hardware. 
 [00:22:45.816] 
There was a lesson there though. 
 
[00:22:47.586] 
The Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator 
Fire that was associated 
 
[00:22:51.156] 
with this was an in-your-face 
fourth-of-July type fire. 
 
[00:22:54.136] 
It was an obvious fire that 
was clearly an immediate threat 
 
[00:22:58.146] 
to the entire Mir spacecraft. 
 
[00:23:01.066] 
The Trace Contaminant Control 
Fire was a much smaller event, 
 
[00:23:05.186] 
and we didn't think much of it. 
 [00:23:06.506] 
But toxicologically, it 
was much more serious. 
 
[00:23:09.466] 
If the carbon monoxide levels 
had been twice what they were 
 
[00:23:12.146] 
on Mir, it could have 
been lethal to the crew. 
 
[00:23:14.546] 
That's how high the carbon 
monoxide levels were. 
 
[00:23:17.276] 
As we flew this over the yeas 
we learned one more lesson I'm 
 
[00:23:21.206] 
reminded of here, 
this piece of tape 
 
[00:23:22.936] 
which is not a very 
sophisticated solution 
 
[00:23:25.996] 
but worked. 
 
[00:23:27.286] 
Sometimes as this 
machine was shipped, 
 
[00:23:30.286] 
it seemed that people 
would either play with this 
 
[00:23:32.496] 
or the switch would get moved. 
 
[00:23:35.166] 
And so by the time the crew 
got it on orbit, it was on 
 
[00:23:38.076] 
and the battery was dead. 
 
[00:23:39.736] 
So this rather inelegant 
but effective solution was 
 
[00:23:43.546] 
to put a piece of tape over. 
 
[00:23:45.746] 
Simple, cheap makes 
you change the drawing. 
 
[00:23:49.016] 
That's about it. 
 
[00:23:50.456] 
Alright. So, those 
were the early days 
 
[00:23:51.746] 
of combustion products 
monitoring. 
 
[00:23:54.036] 
In between there, there was 
fear of moving contaminants 
 [00:23:57.486] 
that were outside the 
vehicle into the vehicle. 
 
[00:24:00.626] 
This was particularly 
on Space Station 
 
[00:24:02.796] 
but also applied to Shuttle. 
 
[00:24:05.586] 
We flew to monitor propellants 
particularly hydrazines, 
 
[00:24:10.846] 
a derivative of a chemical agent 
monitor used by the military. 
 
[00:24:14.156] 
This is like a large flashlight. 
 
[00:24:15.906] 
This is the handle that the 
human is meant to hold here. 
 
[00:24:22.486] 
And the idea was to use 
this to scan the EVA suit 
 
[00:24:25.516] 
when a crew member came 
in if there was a risk 
 
[00:24:27.556] 
of hydrazine contamination. 
 
[00:24:29.736] 
We flew this couple of times, 
it gave negative results. 
 
[00:24:32.186] 
That is no hydrazine 
was brought in. 
 
[00:24:36.006] 
We knew that there had 
to be some modifications 
 
[00:24:38.046] 
to make it respond faster. 
 
[00:24:39.656] 
We had changed the 
dopant in here 
 
[00:24:42.236] 
but the estimate I 
think was something 
 
[00:24:43.866] 
like a half a million dollars 
and the program decided 
 
[00:24:46.366] 
that they weren't gonna pay 
that much for the modifications. 
 
[00:24:49.466] 
So this never flew as 
actual flight hardware 
 
[00:24:51.736] 
but only as an experiment. 
 [00:24:53.516] 
( Pause ) 
 
[00:25:03.646] 
>> Years of work with 
this gave us some wisdom 
 
[00:25:06.956] 
about selecting a new 
combustion products analyzer, 
 
[00:25:11.666] 
which we did not call a 
combustion products analyzer. 
 
[00:25:15.246] 
Somewhat awkwardly we called it 
the compound-specific analyzer 
 
[00:25:19.316] 
for combustion products. 
 
[00:25:21.166] 
So that it was not 
tarred with the reputation 
 
[00:25:24.706] 
that this instrument got, 
I think undeservedly. 
 
[00:25:27.446] 
We made mistakes 
in rushing it on. 
 
[00:25:29.496] 
But this was a pretty 
good instrument. 
 
[00:25:31.276] 
The one failing that 
we saw as a chemist was 
 
[00:25:33.906] 
that the hydrogen fluoride 
sensor never worked right. 
 
[00:25:36.316] 
Hydrogen fluoride is 
important to monitor 
 [00:25:38.556] 
because it's a key product 
from wire insulation burning. 
 
[00:25:42.986] 
We struggled to get a 
hydrogen fluoride sensor 
 
[00:25:45.086] 
that would work and 
we never did. 
 
[00:25:47.006] 
We went to another instrument 
shown here, a good bit smaller 
 
[00:25:51.606] 
and much lighter, but there 
still is no hydrogen fluoride 
 
[00:25:55.086] 
sensor available 
for these units. 
 
[00:25:57.476] 
Instead, we replaced that 
sensor with an oxygen sensor. 
 
[00:26:01.016] 
We felt that during a 
real fire, a big fire, 
 
[00:26:03.376] 
there might be a consumption 
of oxygen and that would need 
 
[00:26:05.596] 
to be followed by the crew. 
 
[00:26:08.386] 
So in this one, we've got a 
hydrogen compensated carbon 
 
[00:26:12.796] 
monoxide sensor, a 
hydrogen cyanide sensor, 
 
[00:26:15.856] 
and what we call a 
hydrogen chloride sensor, 
 
[00:26:18.626] 
but it actually detects all acid 
gases such as hydrogen bromide 
 
[00:26:23.096] 
and hydrogen fluoride. 
 
[00:26:24.296] 
So in a sense, we've 
got hydrogen fluoride 
 
[00:26:26.206] 
covered indirectly. 
 
[00:26:28.396] 
Like the CPA, these are 
electrochemical sensors. 
 
[00:26:32.936] 
We learned some other 
features we wanted. 
 
[00:26:35.546] 
One thing we wanted 
was a zero filter. 
 
[00:26:39.026] 
This goes on a pump head. 
 
[00:26:40.446] 
I will show you what 
that looks like. 
 
[00:26:44.466] 
This pump head fits 
right over the unit. 
 
[00:26:48.326] 
It should come in like this, 
and actually pumps gases 
 
[00:26:53.606] 
over these electrochemical 
sensors. 
 
[00:26:57.166] 
And this particular picture 
shows the zero filter in place. 
 [00:27:01.516] 
The zero filter was 
necessary to make sure 
 
[00:27:04.986] 
that as we were looking at 
the atmosphere after a fire, 
 
[00:27:08.376] 
we could actually zero 
this unit and be sure 
 
[00:27:11.306] 
that the carbon monoxide 
sensor would re-zero properly. 
 
[00:27:15.306] 
And we build this and test 
this in our lab even now. 
 
[00:27:19.566] 
The other issue with that 
device was how to get a sample 
 
[00:27:25.186] 
from behind somewhere 
where there was a fire. 
 
[00:27:28.076] 
This is a wand. 
 
[00:27:29.676] 
We hook it to the pump 
which hooks to this device. 
 
[00:27:33.296] 
And using this attachment, we 
can sample in-behind panels 
 
[00:27:37.736] 
and so on if that's where we 
think the fire is originating. 
 
[00:27:40.626] 
To my knowledge, this has 
only been used once or twice. 
 
[00:27:43.596] 
And it was shown that wherever 
the crew thought the carbon 
 
[00:27:47.696] 
monoxide was coming from, it 
was not coming from there. 
 
[00:27:51.986] 
One other issue with this 
analyzer was whether it ought 
 
[00:27:56.766] 
to alarm, where it 
ought to alarm and how. 
 
[00:28:00.126] 
There is a caution and warning 
system in the Space Station. 
 
[00:28:04.396] 
And we asked the question, 
 
[00:28:07.726] 
okay is this thing loud 
enough to be heard? 
 
[00:28:10.826] 
Do we need to plumb it 
into caution and warning? 
 
[00:28:13.406] 
One thing we've learned is if 
you're gonna plumb something 
 
[00:28:16.336] 
into a distributive system 
like caution and warning, 
 
[00:28:19.436] 
you're gonna pay a real price 
in dollars and in anguish 
 
[00:28:23.426] 
to get it into that system. 
 
[00:28:24.616] 
So if you can make a stand-alone 
analyzer, it's a good thing. 
 
[00:28:28.046] 
By the way, this slide's 
now on Shuttle and Station. 
 
[00:28:32.956] 
Its alarm is not loud 
enough to be heard 
 
[00:28:35.196] 
by the crew given the noise 
in the Shuttle or Station. 
 
[00:28:38.826] 
We had thought about flying 
an alarm-- alarm enhancer. 
 
[00:28:44.326] 
That's this thing. 
 
[00:28:45.936] 
In case you want to-- 
 
[00:28:48.236] 
( Beeping ) 
 
[00:28:48.303] 
>> That is deemed loud 
enough to be heard 
 
[00:28:51.806] 
on station should it go off. 
 
[00:28:54.606] 
The powers that be 
decided in their wisdom 
 
[00:28:57.786] 
that we really didn't 
need an alarm that loud 
 
[00:28:59.956] 
with a little instrument 
like this 
 
[00:29:02.296] 
that the crew would actually be 
able to see the visual flashing 
 
[00:29:07.676] 
which these things 
do when necessary. 
 
[00:29:11.636] 
For sometime, this was 
actually on all the time. 
 
[00:29:15.916] 
It's the first alert monitoring. 
 
[00:29:17.626] 
Now it is not. 
 
[00:29:18.666] 
These are deployed around the 
station and there are 4 of them. 
 
[00:29:21.426] 
And I think only one 
flies on the Shuttle now. 
 
[00:29:24.226] 
For a while, we flew 
two of them. 
 
[00:29:28.736] 
Okay. That's combustion 
products analyzer. 
 [00:29:31.556] 
We are looking for 
improvements on this. 
 
[00:29:34.096] 
It will be hard to beat this. 
 
[00:29:36.936] 
Electrochemical sensors 
are a little bit squirrely 
 
[00:29:39.076] 
in the sense that they 
are not always specific 
 
[00:29:40.776] 
for a given compounds. 
 
[00:29:42.366] 
And sometimes if you 
overdrive them with a huge dose 
 
[00:29:45.136] 
of what they're measuring, 
they misbehave. 
 
[00:29:49.046] 
But right now, there's 
good as there is out there. 
 
[00:29:52.186] 
[00:29:53.536] 
We knew that on Space Station, 
 
[00:29:55.436] 
the crew would be there 
a long time and we wanted 
 
[00:29:57.516] 
to fly an analyzer 
for volatile organics. 
 
[00:30:01.176] 
[00:30:02.706] 
>> The program asked us if 
we wanted to fly as part 
 
[00:30:05.456] 
of risk mitigation experiments 
on the Shuttle and we leapt 
 
[00:30:08.586] 
at the opportunity, if you will. 
 
[00:30:11.256] 
This is the Volatile Organics 
Analyzer we eventually flew 
 
[00:30:15.186] 
on Station. 
 
[00:30:16.106] 
We flew it twice on 
Shuttle STS-86 and STS-89. 
 
[00:30:20.536] 
The first time it didn't 
work at all and we ended 
 
[00:30:22.496] 
up just bringing it back. 
 
[00:30:23.386] 
The second time we had to 
do an in-flight maintenance. 
 
[00:30:26.426] 
I think it was several hours. 
 
[00:30:28.576] 
It was a complex process. 
 
[00:30:30.896] 
We did learn from that that the 
crew, if properly instructed 
 
[00:30:34.686] 
by very smart ground 
controllers, 
 
[00:30:37.546] 
can fix a really 
complex instrument. 
 
[00:30:41.596] 
This thing has flown now 
for 8 years on Station 
 
[00:30:44.076] 
and has performed well. 
 
[00:30:46.226] 
Two lessons we learned here. 
 
[00:30:47.496] 
One, this was a one 
of a kind bill 
 
[00:30:49.386] 
that cost several million 
dollars for each instrument. 
 
[00:30:52.376] 
It's very expensive, 
extremely complex. 
 
[00:30:56.426] 
Safety required us to put 
a lot of fuses in here 
 
[00:30:59.216] 
and I'm not gonna attack 
their wisdom, but it tended 
 
[00:31:01.876] 
to be the fuses that failed 
and not the instrument itself. 
 
[00:31:05.956] 
Complexity is something to 
stay away from if you can. 
 
[00:31:10.396] 
The other thing we 
learned is about crew time. 
 
[00:31:12.986] 
This thing could be 
programmed from the ground 
 
[00:31:16.796] 
and operate independently 
of the crew. 
 
[00:31:19.526] 
So we got a lot of samples. 
 
[00:31:20.926] 
Other analyzers like this, 
for example for water, 
 
[00:31:25.326] 
had to be dragged out, 
set up and then operated 
 
[00:31:28.916] 
over 45 minutes to 
an hour of crew time 
 
[00:31:31.366] 
and that never happened for 
some of those instruments. 
 
[00:31:34.136] 
So minimize crew time. 
 
[00:31:36.236] 
Another thing to minimize is 
how dependent your devices are 
 
[00:31:47.156] 
on the resources of 
the parent vehicle. 
 
[00:31:50.366] 
For example the Volatile 
Organic Analyzer was dependent 
 
[00:31:53.026] 
on nitrogen from one of the 
ECLSS systems to operate. 
 
[00:31:58.646] 
And we were not aware that ECLSS 
 
[00:32:02.336] 
for example was gonna 
periodically shut 
 
[00:32:04.236] 
down the nitrogen system 
to purge it and so on 
 
[00:32:06.646] 
and they didn't know to tell us. 
 
[00:32:08.386] 
And so we had some real 
hiccups for a few times 
 [00:32:11.206] 
when they were maintaining 
their nitrogen system 
 
[00:32:14.916] 
and our instrument over here 
went crazy wondering what 
 
[00:32:17.436] 
happened to its nitrogen supply. 
 
[00:32:19.716] 
Okay, one last instrument I'd 
 
[00:32:22.486] 
like to show you is a 
carbon dioxide monitor. 
 
[00:32:25.626] 
We were asked to 
put this instrument 
 
[00:32:28.376] 
on by the Environmental 
Control and Life Support people 
 
[00:32:32.266] 
because they felt that 
their whole module sensor 
 
[00:32:36.816] 
on Shuttle was not giving a true 
reading of the carbon dioxide 
 
[00:32:41.126] 
that the crew was 
being exposed to. 
 
[00:32:43.806] 
And so we got this 
handheld device. 
 
[00:32:45.576] 
And actually in space the crew 
members can actually hook it 
 
[00:32:48.696] 
into a vest or something if you 
want to measure carbon dioxide, 
 [00:32:51.586] 
let's say when they're 
exercising. 
 
[00:32:53.356] 
And this was used to 
determine if there were pockets 
 
[00:32:55.656] 
of carbon dioxide from 
human metabolism and so on. 
 
[00:32:59.676] 
It's built by the same 
company that builds ugly boxes 
 
[00:33:03.536] 
for combustion products. 
 
[00:33:05.046] 
As you can see, this is a very 
different technology though. 
 
[00:33:08.156] 
This is infrared spectrometry. 
 
[00:33:11.686] 
This is an exceptionally 
good instrument. 
 
[00:33:14.386] 
I could throw this across 
the room, pick it up 
 
[00:33:16.206] 
and it'd still be calibrated. 
 
[00:33:17.976] 
We brought these things 
back and even 4 or 500 days 
 
[00:33:20.796] 
after they were calibrated, 
flown and brought back, 
 
[00:33:23.476] 
they still operate very well. 
 
[00:33:25.866] 
The one thing that's needed is 
a little filter to remove water 
 
[00:33:32.476] 
so that the tiny infrared 
cell in here gives a-- 
 
[00:33:37.846] 
is not confused by the 
water being present. 
 
[00:33:40.536] 
And this thing is 
fun to play with. 
 
[00:33:41.746] 
Not only can you blow into it 
 
[00:33:43.116] 
and make carbon dioxide 
jack it up. 
 
[00:33:46.766] 
This thing is kind of cute too. 
 
[00:33:48.706] 
Okay. Now, you can cut 
that out if you want. 
 
[00:33:52.866] 
Now I want to go on to 
non-hardware lessons. 
 
[00:33:59.776] 
I guess I might capture 
the hardware lessons here 
 
[00:34:02.636] 
in summary just about briefly. 
 
[00:34:05.426] 
Don't let them push you to fly 
hardware before it's ready. 
 
[00:34:11.856] 
Keep it simple. 
 
[00:34:13.846] 
Don't depend on other people's 
systems to drive your hardware 
 [00:34:19.866] 
and don't use crew time 
if you can help it. 
 
[00:34:24.466] 
Make it small, make it reliable, 
and don't over promise. 
 
[00:34:29.396] 
And they will always 
remember the failures. 
 
[00:34:34.386] 
Okay, non-hardware lessons. 
 
[00:34:37.756] 
Going into Shuttle in the early 
'90s, we realized that a lot 
 
[00:34:41.936] 
of chemicals were 
flying in the vehicle 
 
[00:34:45.646] 
that the crew didn't 
know how to deal with it. 
 
[00:34:47.396] 
They were to escape either from 
a system or from a payload. 
 
[00:34:50.836] 
So we developed what 
we called the Bluebook. 
 
[00:34:52.606] 
It was about this size. 
 
[00:34:55.316] 
And for each mission, we'd make 
one of this like a pamphlet 
 
[00:34:58.766] 
and give it to the BME so they 
can have it at the console then. 
 
[00:35:02.286] 
And they could look up certain 
chemicals in there if they were 
 [00:35:05.936] 
to escape and determine how 
toxic they were and sort 
 
[00:35:09.036] 
of figure out what to do. 
 
[00:35:11.596] 
That evolved during 
the Shuttle era 
 
[00:35:13.966] 
into a hazard material 
summary database. 
 
[00:35:17.276] 
It's computerized. 
 
[00:35:18.696] 
It's available to the crew 
on Shuttle and on station. 
 
[00:35:22.456] 
It's available to the Flight 
Surgeons, the BMEs and a number 
 
[00:35:25.456] 
of other people that use it. 
 
[00:35:26.616] 
Very quickly if something 
leaks, the crew 
 
[00:35:29.556] 
or others can determine 
what it is that is leaking 
 
[00:35:32.256] 
and what the hazard level is. 
 
[00:35:34.516] 
And we are in the process of 
getting decals on all the pieces 
 
[00:35:37.586] 
of hardware up there at least 
on the US side of the Station 
 
[00:35:41.556] 
and also on the Shuttle 
 
[00:35:42.776] 
that indicate the 
crew's immediate response 
 
[00:35:47.476] 
if something is leaking. 
 
[00:35:49.586] 
[00:35:54.746] 
One thing we learned about 
building that database is 
 
[00:35:57.616] 
that we always had to verify 
what we thought was gonna fly 
 
[00:36:00.126] 
with the PI that 
was gonna fly it. 
 
[00:36:03.816] 
We found before we were 
doing a verification process, 
 [00:36:06.626] 
we found that the PI might 
change their mind right before 
 
[00:36:09.906] 
flight and slip something in 
on us that was never intended 
 
[00:36:13.696] 
to be part of that experiment 
or we didn't know about. 
 
[00:36:16.446] 
So actually now what 
we've got is a two-tiered 
 
[00:36:18.416] 
verification process. 
 
[00:36:20.256] 
When a principal investigator 
proposes to fly a payload 
 
[00:36:23.456] 
with chemicals in it, 
we ask them what group 
 
[00:36:27.366] 
of chemicals they are gonna 
fly and give us a list 
 
[00:36:29.326] 
of their proposed chemicals, 
knowing that not all will fly. 
 
[00:36:32.846] 
We do an assessment 
of those and then 
 
[00:36:35.656] 
when the experiment 
is packed for flight 
 
[00:36:38.086] 
that may be a few months before 
flight or it may be on the day 
 
[00:36:40.926] 
of launch we ask 
 [00:36:42.716] 
for verification of 
exactly what flew. 
 
[00:36:45.376] 
So that when the database 
is put together for the crew 
 
[00:36:47.756] 
and for the Flight Surgeons 
and so on, it is accurate 
 
[00:36:51.066] 
as we could possibly make it. 
 
[00:36:53.746] 
We also learned during 
the Shuttle era 
 
[00:36:55.496] 
that we needed to be on call. 
 
[00:36:57.946] 
And since those days and always 
there's been a NASA toxicologist 
 
[00:37:01.936] 
on call, there has been a 
contractor mission specialist, 
 
[00:37:05.566] 
that is a contractor 
toxicologist 
 
[00:37:07.856] 
who knows the details of the 
experiments that are flying 
 
[00:37:10.776] 
and knows about the toxic 
chemicals that are in there. 
 
[00:37:13.516] 
And we also have a 
contractor hardware specialist, 
 
[00:37:16.386] 
always on call to deal 
with whichever one 
 [00:37:19.126] 
of these things might be flying. 
 
[00:37:21.126] 
And those people are the people 
 
[00:37:23.146] 
that calibrate the 
instruments in the lab. 
 
[00:37:24.916] 
They know how they behave. 
 
[00:37:25.936] 
They know their idiosyncrasies 
and so on. 
 
[00:37:28.266] 
And they can be very valuable 
 
[00:37:29.836] 
when an issue comes 
up on the orbit. 
 
[00:37:33.826] 
There were a number of ground 
based issues that pertain 
 
[00:37:36.926] 
to toxicology during 
the early 1990s. 
 
[00:37:40.656] 
One involved the application 
of dimethyl-ethoxysilane 
 
[00:37:45.066] 
to the orbiter thermal tiles 
 
[00:37:47.776] 
that coat the underneath 
side of the orbiter. 
 
[00:37:51.236] 
What was happening was 
some of the workers 
 
[00:37:53.966] 
down at KSC were getting sick 
 [00:37:55.476] 
when they were injecting 
the tiles. 
 
[00:37:57.916] 
And so there was a 
big angst over that 
 
[00:37:59.526] 
and the industrial hygenist 
down there called this 
 
[00:38:01.916] 
and asked us to get involved. 
 
[00:38:04.126] 
It turned out that no one 
had done a credible tox study 
 
[00:38:06.976] 
on dimethyl-ethoxysilane 
so we proposed to do 
 
[00:38:10.336] 
that to the Shuttle 
programs in the tune 
 
[00:38:11.976] 
of about a million bucks 
 
[00:38:14.066] 
and after they swallowed 
a little bit-- 
 
[00:38:17.056] 
and we assured them that that's 
the only way they were gonna get 
 
[00:38:19.166] 
a limit, they came up with 
the million bucks for us. 
 
[00:38:22.566] 
We contracted out 
a study and found 
 
[00:38:24.256] 
that it was not that toxic. 
 
[00:38:26.596] 
But because of the 
monitoring of the humans and so 
 
[00:38:30.766] 
on at Kennedy Space Center and 
the frequency of the events, 
 
[00:38:34.616] 
there was a fairly low level 
set by the American Conference 
 
[00:38:38.506] 
of Governmental Industrial 
Hygenists. 
 
[00:38:40.686] 
We actually went to that 
group and proposed a TLV 
 
[00:38:44.036] 
for BMES and got it approved. 
 
[00:38:46.476] 
And that has governed 
the operations 
 
[00:38:48.476] 
at Kennedy Space Center since. 
 
[00:38:51.816] 
There was another issue 
 
[00:38:52.996] 
in the late '80s involving 
the toxicity of Halon 1301. 
 
[00:38:57.446] 
That's the fire extinguisher 
that's used 
 
[00:38:59.326] 
in the Shuttle and even now. 
 
[00:39:01.946] 
The question was 
 
[00:39:03.036] 
if inadvertently a fire 
extinguisher were released 
 [00:39:06.246] 
on Shuttle, how soon will 
the crew have to come back? 
 
[00:39:09.356] 
Because we knew that this fire 
extinguisher was not scrubbed 
 
[00:39:12.986] 
well and the answer 
was we don't know 
 
[00:39:15.806] 
because we don't know how 
toxic it is to humans. 
 
[00:39:18.426] 
So there's actually a human 
experiment done in the late '80s 
 
[00:39:21.846] 
where humans were exposed, 
I think it was 8 humans 
 
[00:39:24.456] 
for 24 hours to this 
material and it was very clear 
 
[00:39:28.206] 
that Halon 1301 was a good 
choice from the point of view 
 
[00:39:31.646] 
of not being toxic to 
humans at reasonable levels. 
 
[00:39:35.176] 
And so the flight rules were 
modified to reduce the risk 
 
[00:39:38.526] 
of going to a primary 
landing site 
 
[00:39:40.616] 
or an emergency landing site. 
 
[00:39:42.656] 
Both of those events to my 
knowledge have never taken place 
 
[00:39:46.616] 
but I'm told they're very risky. 
 
[00:39:49.266] 
And you don't want to go to 
those unless you really have to. 
 
[00:39:52.276] 
And so, we had a 
really good flight rule 
 
[00:39:54.356] 
for Halon discharge 
if it were to occur. 
 
[00:39:59.046] 
>> The last thing I want to 
mention is that over the years 
 
[00:40:01.956] 
of Shuttle, say from about 
1990 until 2008 we worked 
 
[00:40:05.986] 
with the National Research 
Council Committee on Toxicology 
 
[00:40:09.066] 
to get improved limits for the 
Shuttle and for Space Station. 
 
[00:40:14.276] 
Before this, an individual in 
our group was setting limits 
 
[00:40:18.256] 
and while I had no doubt that 
he did a good incredible job, 
 
[00:40:21.226] 
the pedigree of those 
limits was not very clear. 
 
[00:40:24.206] 
So we really wanted to get the 
endorsement of an outside group 
 
[00:40:27.396] 
that involved cognizant experts. 
 
[00:40:30.116] 
And so in front of 
a panel of about 12 
 
[00:40:32.506] 
to 15 expert toxicologists 
we developed our limits 
 
[00:40:36.606] 
and they are published 
in a series of volumes. 
 
[00:40:38.566] 
The air limits look like 
this and the water limits are 
 
[00:40:42.736] 
in a different colored booklet. 
 
[00:40:44.876] 
But these are all fully 
documented and approved 
 
[00:40:47.516] 
by the National Research 
Council Committee on toxicology 
 
[00:40:51.356] 
and published by the 
Academy of Sciences. 
 
[00:40:53.926] 
And that has proven to 
be a worthwhile thing 
 
[00:40:56.206] 
to do while not cheap and not 
without its required effort. 
 
[00:41:00.206] 
There was a need to stand up so 
to speak to some Russian limits 
 
[00:41:03.956] 
that were a bit irrational 
in our opinion and because 
 
[00:41:06.576] 
of the pedigree of our limits we 
were at least able to get them 
 
[00:41:09.136] 
and the requirements 
for a Space Station. 
 
[00:41:12.236] 
And we hoped to return to 
that effort in a few years. 
 
[00:41:16.216] 
So in summary, there's a lot 
of things to pay attention 
 
[00:41:22.656] 
to in terms of toxicology 
in the Shuttle era. 
 
[00:41:27.326] 
You need to be available 
if you're a toxicologist 
 
[00:41:30.026] 
to support the people on flight. 
 [00:41:32.046] 
And when an emergency comes up 
there needs to be a tier system 
 
[00:41:37.356] 
where if I'm called I can call 
somebody that really knows 
 
[00:41:39.846] 
about hardware which I don't. 
 
[00:41:43.416] 
If you're going to set 
limits for people living 
 
[00:41:45.946] 
in space vehicles you must 
do it in a very competent way 
 
[00:41:50.436] 
and in a way that 
others can understand 
 
[00:41:53.116] 
that these are good limits and 
not just something you cooked 
 
[00:41:57.166] 
up in a few minutes 
on your desk. 
 
[00:42:00.566] 
And I'll leave it at that. 
 
[00:42:02.356] 
Questions? 
 
[00:42:03.516] 
( Pause ) 
 
[00:42:08.056] 
>> I've been asked 
to talk a little bit 
 
[00:42:09.966] 
about how toxicology came to 
matter for the space program. 
 
[00:42:15.676] 
From the very earliest days, 
that would be the early 60s, 
 
[00:42:18.986] 
when we decided we were 
going to put humans 
 
[00:42:20.966] 
in space there was 
a lot of concern 
 
[00:42:23.096] 
about off gassing the materials 
that would go into the capsule. 
 
[00:42:27.116] 
And there are old memos from 
'64-'65 where there were a lot 
 
[00:42:33.266] 
of questions and concerns about 
the off gassing of hardware. 
 
[00:42:36.276] 
And NASA actually engaged the 
National Academy of Sciences 
 
[00:42:39.426] 
in those days to set 
limits for the compounds 
 
[00:42:42.116] 
that we thought might come off 
of materials that would off gas. 
 
[00:42:47.736] 
Sampling in those days 
consisted of this. 
 
[00:42:51.046] 
Taking the charcoal 
filters that were used 
 
[00:42:53.106] 
to clean the air during the 
Mercury or Gemini flight 
 
[00:42:57.016] 
and bring them back to the 
lab actually where it is now 
 [00:43:00.176] 
and analyze the charcoal. 
 
[00:43:03.656] 
They sort the material off of 
there and analyzed the charcoal 
 
[00:43:06.846] 
to get an idea of 
what was it one time 
 
[00:43:09.486] 
and the air had been removed. 
 
[00:43:12.056] 
There were some old 
reports that show a list 
 
[00:43:15.706] 
of probably a hundred compounds 
with a table that shows yes, 
 
[00:43:20.556] 
they were there or no, they 
weren't, but no quantification. 
 
[00:43:24.706] 
[00:43:27.356] 
The limits that were given to 
us by the Academy of Sciences 
 
[00:43:30.806] 
in those days were, 
pick a number. 
 
[00:43:34.986] 
They were based on very little 
documentation and were more 
 
[00:43:39.436] 
or less promulgated by the 
fact that they were set 
 
[00:43:43.626] 
by a presumably credible body 
and that that body didn't have 
 
[00:43:47.726] 
to subject itself 
to documentation 
 
[00:43:50.836] 
of how they actually 
set the limits. 
 
[00:43:53.076] 
I believe it was 
by the early 70s. 
 
[00:43:57.036] 
We were actually beginning 
to think about going to Mars. 
 
[00:43:59.876] 
And some of those limits were 
extended out to a thousand days. 
 
[00:44:03.896] 
[00:44:05.316] 
Sampling evolved to the point 
 
[00:44:07.826] 
where some solid sorbent 
samplers were used 
 [00:44:10.866] 
in a crude form on 
Skylab I believe. 
 
[00:44:14.596] 
There was a mass spectrometer on 
Skylab but it was not designed 
 
[00:44:17.676] 
to quantify air quality. 
 
[00:44:20.686] 
And then the Shuttle 
came along and that's 
 
[00:44:24.326] 
when we got perhaps more serious 
about monitoring air quality. 
 
[00:44:31.466] 
The drivers of that 
were first of all, 
 
[00:44:34.606] 
there were small burn instance. 
 
[00:44:36.326] 
I believe it was STS-6, 
some of the electronics 
 
[00:44:41.066] 
that were driving the 
humidification system 
 
[00:44:43.416] 
or the dehumidifier pyrolyzed. 
 
[00:44:47.036] 
And if you can imagine 
being in a small space 
 
[00:44:49.776] 
with something burning 
and have no way out, 
 
[00:44:52.176] 
that's really not 
where you want to be. 
 
[00:44:54.446] 
And then there were 
other events, 
 
[00:44:55.896] 
the teleprinter cable burned. 
 
[00:44:57.946] 
There were two burns of the 
data display unit on STS-35 
 
[00:45:02.736] 
and it was actually 
strong enough and smelled 
 
[00:45:06.076] 
that it woke up the crew. 
 
[00:45:08.376] 
And that drives a lot of need 
 
[00:45:09.946] 
for combustion product 
monitoring. 
 
[00:45:12.026] 
We saw a lot of volatile 
organics in the air of Shuttle 
 
[00:45:15.956] 
and it was clear that if we were 
gonna fly vehicles for a long, 
 
[00:45:21.236] 
long time for example, the 
Space Station or something 
 
[00:45:24.336] 
that monitoring the volatile 
organics would be important. 
 
[00:45:27.436] 
Now where do these 
things come from? 
 
[00:45:29.086] 
They come from off 
gassing as I said, 
 
[00:45:30.746] 
and that can be controlled. 
 
[00:45:32.326] 
If they come from 
payloads that leak, 
 
[00:45:34.416] 
they come from utility 
chemicals that are used. 
 
[00:45:36.776] 
Anywhere from deodorants, 
hair processing materials, 
 
[00:45:42.686] 
body washes, sodding 
experiments. 
 
[00:45:46.116] 
There are just any 
numbers of sources 
 
[00:45:48.716] 
and there are things 
we see in the air, 
 [00:45:50.526] 
the origin of which 
we simply don't know. 
 
[00:45:53.336] 
Occasionally we see a spike 
of ethanol and the source 
 
[00:45:56.436] 
of that can be speculated on. 
 
[00:45:58.816] 
But the Space Station 
era's quite a Pandora's Box 
 
[00:46:03.306] 
of chemical pollution, 
usually at very low levels. 
 
[00:46:08.886] 
We also wanted to deal with 
incidences where things 
 
[00:46:11.496] 
that weren't exactly a 
pyrolysis product escaped. 
 
[00:46:15.026] 
That's why we've gone to 
volatile organic analyzers 
 
[00:46:17.886] 
to characterize the air 
in situations like that. 
 
[00:46:22.316] 
What we've actually seen 
with a modern analyzer 
 
[00:46:25.166] 
that I don't have here is we 
can actually follow the opening 
 
[00:46:28.026] 
of a new module. 
 
[00:46:29.266] 
These tend to have a 
build up of pollutants 
 [00:46:31.296] 
because they don't have 
an air cleaner in them. 
 
[00:46:33.666] 
So when the hatch 
is opened on Station 
 
[00:46:36.986] 
so that the crew could 
enter these modules 
 
[00:46:39.516] 
and they have been sealed up for 
30 days or 45 days there's a lot 
 
[00:46:43.246] 
of pollution in there. 
 
[00:46:44.226] 
And we can actually see that 
pollution come across Station 
 
[00:46:46.686] 
and reach our analyzers that 
are typically in the lab 
 
[00:46:50.086] 
and increase the values there. 
 
[00:46:53.456] 
So that's kind of the story of 
where the pollutants come from 
 
[00:46:58.336] 
and why we monitor them. 
 
[00:47:00.476] 
Clearly if we're going to go to 
a distant destination for a year 
 
[00:47:04.486] 
and a half we're gonna have 
 
[00:47:05.576] 
to have very small 
reliable analyzers 
 
[00:47:08.526] 
that don't require a lot 
of crew time to manipulate. 
 
[00:47:13.796] 
Next question. 
 
[00:47:14.516] 
>> So why don't you just use the 
same kind of analyzers on orbit 
 
[00:47:17.566] 
that we've used on the ground? 
 
[00:47:22.396] 
>> Well, okay let's 
take an example. 
 
[00:47:25.666] 
The instrument we use 
to analyze these things 
 
[00:47:27.996] 
with covers the desktop. 
 
[00:47:31.876] 
And we have four 
instruments in my lab. 
 
[00:47:36.096] 
In a good day, a 
good day is when two 
 
[00:47:39.246] 
of those are working very well. 
 
[00:47:40.986] 
GC Mass Spectrometers 
tend to be very fickle. 
 
[00:47:46.706] 
They're very complex. 
 
[00:47:49.706] 
So you need to fly 
something else 
 
[00:47:54.126] 
and I won't elaborate on that. 
 
[00:47:56.546] 
There are simpler concept-- 
conceptually simpler analyzers 
 
[00:47:59.876] 
that are perhaps not as powerful 
 
[00:48:01.686] 
as the GC mass spec. Right now 
we're flying a differential 
 
[00:48:08.186] 
mobility spectrometer and I 
won't go into what that is 
 
[00:48:11.526] 
but it's a rather 
robust detector 
 
[00:48:13.696] 
to put behind the 
gas chromatograph. 
 
[00:48:16.156] 
And that instrument has proven 
very effective on Station. 
 [00:48:20.116] 
It doesn't have the 
analytical power 
 
[00:48:21.666] 
of the mass spectrometer, 
I would say that. 
 
[00:48:24.776] 
But it is much smaller and 
it's much more reliable. 
 
[00:48:27.626] 
We could bet on being 
operating 6 months to a year 
 
[00:48:30.586] 
from when we would fly it, 
 
[00:48:32.066] 
whereas mass spectrometers 
tend to be very fragile. 
 
[00:48:36.226] 
Instruments of flight should 
draw very little power that's 
 
[00:48:41.076] 
for obvious reasons. 
 
[00:48:42.036] 
You only have so much 
power in any vehicle 
 
[00:48:44.256] 
and it gets distributed 
and shared 
 
[00:48:46.406] 
and you only get 
your portion of it. 
 
[00:48:49.256] 
And as I said earlier you want 
 
[00:48:50.636] 
to be independent 
of any resources. 
 
[00:48:52.896] 
For example the mass 
spectrometer, 
 
[00:48:56.756] 
this being flown now has to 
have helium as a carrier gas 
 
[00:48:59.996] 
and they have to 
bring their own gas. 
 
[00:49:03.956] 
We got burned with the 
DOA because we depended 
 
[00:49:07.956] 
on Space Station nitrogen 
 
[00:49:10.096] 
and that was not a reliable 
source all the time. 
 
[00:49:15.326] 
So I think that's a reasonably 
long answer to your question. 
 
[00:49:18.896] 
>> So how has the role of 
the toxicologist changed 
 
[00:49:22.296] 
in the early days 
of space flight 
 
[00:49:25.146] 
to the Shuttle era in terms of-- 
 
[00:49:27.446] 
>> Okay. 
 
[00:49:27.996] 
>> What your role is and 
how you're gonna arrive 
 
[00:49:29.946] 
to this (inaudible)? 
 
[00:49:32.126] 
[00:49:34.406] 
>> I have some knowledge 
of what toxicology was 
 
[00:49:38.096] 
like let's say in 
the 70s and 80s. 
 
[00:49:41.156] 
A man named Elliot Harris was 
actually chief for sometime. 
 
[00:49:47.996] 
This would have been in the late 
Apollo era lead up to Shuttle. 
 
[00:49:52.466] 
He was Branch Chief of 
the toxicology branch 
 
[00:49:57.046] 
at Johnson Space Center. 
 
[00:49:59.366] 
For reasons I don't know he left 
 
[00:50:01.966] 
and the toxicology branch 
disappeared and became a goob. 
 
[00:50:05.056] 
>> In those days, their main 
task was not to set limits 
 
[00:50:11.576] 
in a lot of the things 
we do, it was to deal 
 
[00:50:14.376] 
with offgassing issues and a 
number of other issues that had 
 
[00:50:18.586] 
to do with developing a space 
vehicle like the Shuttle. 
 
[00:50:23.196] 
That kind of involvement has 
kind of taken two directions. 
 
[00:50:27.006] 
One direction is toward 
developing really credible 
 
[00:50:33.796] 
ironclad limits that have 
a really strong pedigree 
 
[00:50:37.796] 
and aren't set by an individual. 
 
[00:50:40.116] 
The other is to more involvement 
 
[00:50:42.116] 
on a real-time basis 
with the missions. 
 
[00:50:44.986] 
That really makes it fun 
to be a toxicologist here. 
 
[00:50:48.496] 
Right now, we're 
probably working three 
 
[00:50:50.686] 
or four relatively 
important issues related 
 
[00:50:53.636] 
to Space Station right now. 
 
[00:50:56.196] 
And we get called into meetings 
and our expertise gets dissected 
 
[00:51:01.156] 
and we have to communicate 
 
[00:51:02.556] 
to engineers what often is 
rather fuzzy and uncertain data 
 
[00:51:06.606] 
in a way that they believe it. 
 
[00:51:09.506] 
One incident that 
comes to mind is 
 
[00:51:12.436] 
when this little motor 
burned up on STS-40. 
 
[00:51:18.466] 
As I said before, it wasn't 
 
[00:51:19.926] 
in the orbiter refrigerator 
freezer. 
 
[00:51:23.616] 
We really were way off 
track during flight 
 
[00:51:26.386] 
as to what caused that. 
 
[00:51:28.586] 
The crew said this thing 
reeked and we can't stand it. 
 
[00:51:31.726] 
Eventually, we gave the crew 
permission to turn the thing off 
 [00:51:35.486] 
and put duct tape over all 
the openings and that began 
 
[00:51:38.426] 
to control the odor 
a little bit. 
 
[00:51:41.046] 
We thought at that time it might 
have been offgassing so to speak 
 
[00:51:44.796] 
from urine that was spilled 
inside the refrigerator. 
 
[00:51:47.166] 
And when we got the unit back 
and examined it, it was clear 
 
[00:51:51.116] 
that we were way off base. 
 
[00:51:52.336] 
That it was actually 
a pyrolysis event. 
 
[00:51:54.506] 
The motor had burned up. 
 
[00:51:56.826] 
During the mission, a colleague 
of mine, Dr. Chiu-Wing Lam 
 
[00:52:01.056] 
and I were called in 
to deal with this issue 
 
[00:52:04.396] 
and I can remember 
it was a Saturday. 
 
[00:52:06.666] 
And for whatever reason we both 
had charge of our little kids. 
 
[00:52:11.326] 
I don't remember 
where our wives were 
 [00:52:13.146] 
but we brought our 
little kids in here. 
 
[00:52:15.466] 
And so there were four bored 
little kids while we sat 
 
[00:52:18.976] 
and tried to deliberate 
with the other people 
 
[00:52:21.336] 
about what was going on with the 
orbiter refrigerator freezer. 
 
[00:52:25.906] 
But it was fun and I don't 
suppose it killed the kids. 
 
[00:52:29.036] 
But as I said, we 
were at that time, 
 
[00:52:31.776] 
because we didn't have the tools 
we needed, we were far off base 
 
[00:52:35.466] 
in terms of understanding 
what happened. 
 
[00:52:38.136] 
[00:52:40.586] 
>> So, tell us-- think back over 
the years, followed scenarios, 
 
[00:52:46.076] 
just tell us another 
shuttle story 
 
[00:52:50.146] 
and what might be your most 
memorable Shuttle memory 
 
[00:52:55.046] 
regarding toxicology? 
 
[00:52:57.796] 
[00:52:59.296] 
>> Well, I guess that 
could be good or bad. 
 
[00:53:01.706] 
[00:53:04.886] 
I remember when we had 
gotten the CPA modified 
 
[00:53:08.376] 
so that we thought it wasn't 
sensitive to hydrogen. 
 
[00:53:11.876] 
And then we had the problem with 
the data display units burning. 
 
[00:53:19.176] 
I was called over to Mission 
Control to help sort out things, 
 
[00:53:22.576] 
and the flight sergeant 
was John Schultz. 
 
[00:53:24.996] 
And Sam Pool was 
the Division Chief. 
 
[00:53:26.996] 
Sam didn't buy tools and 
so, we were over there 
 
[00:53:31.666] 
and we were going over whether 
the increased carbon monoxide 
 
[00:53:35.496] 
readings were true. 
 
[00:53:39.716] 
And they were high enough 
that if they were true, 
 
[00:53:42.506] 
it might affect crew 
performance, 
 
[00:53:45.306] 
including the pilot. 
 [00:53:46.506] 
He was gonna have 
to land the Shuttle. 
 
[00:53:48.056] 
And there was a lot of 
debate going back and forth 
 
[00:53:54.006] 
about the levels of carbon 
monoxide, the capabilities 
 
[00:53:56.916] 
of the pilot, should it be on 
his a visor and so on and so on. 
 
[00:54:00.876] 
How long would it take to 
wash the carbon monoxide 
 
[00:54:03.026] 
out if-- were in there? 
 
[00:54:06.406] 
Eventually, I was really 
impressed with Sam. 
 
[00:54:09.366] 
He listened to me, he 
listened to the surgeons, 
 
[00:54:12.016] 
he listened to the other people 
then he decided we were not 
 
[00:54:15.956] 
gonna trust the instrument. 
 
[00:54:17.306] 
We were gonna go and land 
as we were gonna land 
 
[00:54:20.446] 
in the first place, and we did. 
 
[00:54:22.726] 
And he was right. 
 
[00:54:25.306] 
The message there I think is you 
get all the information you have 
 
[00:54:29.856] 
and you make your best decision. 
 
[00:54:30.996] 
All the information 
may not be very good 
 
[00:54:36.246] 
but when it's the best you're 
gonna get, you gotta go with it. 
 
[00:54:40.216] 
And he made a good 
call in that case. 
 
[00:54:42.396] 
And we learned that you don't 
fly it until it's ready to fly. 
 
[00:54:49.186] 
A lot of really great 
things have happened 
 [00:54:51.856] 
in the toxicology group 
 
[00:54:53.026] 
in the 21 years I've 
been associated with it. 
 
[00:54:56.406] 
[00:54:58.226] 
I'm impressed in many ways 
 
[00:55:02.126] 
but let me highlight 
at least two of them. 
 
[00:55:04.546] 
One is the ability 
of the chemists 
 
[00:55:09.436] 
and the contractor team, 
to not only analyze samples 
 
[00:55:14.816] 
and device clever sampling 
techniques but also to identify 
 
[00:55:22.556] 
and very carefully 
scrutinize instruments 
 
[00:55:26.216] 
that we might fly onboard, 
 
[00:55:27.626] 
either the Shuttle 
or the Space Station. 
 
[00:55:30.496] 
[00:55:32.126] 
It takes a sense of 
vision and intelligence 
 
[00:55:36.296] 
and a knowledge that's 
rare in many places. 
 
[00:55:41.376] 
It has not been rare in my group 
and my good fortune to work 
 
[00:55:45.966] 
with that group has 
been in many cases 
 
[00:55:48.526] 
because of those excellent 
analytical chemists 
 
[00:55:53.496] 
that stay abreast of current 
technology and know how 
 
[00:55:57.396] 
to adapt something 
for space flight. 
 
[00:56:00.056] 
The other thing I wanna 
highlight is the expertise 
 
[00:56:02.846] 
that resides in a 
toxicologist that works 
 [00:56:05.346] 
at Johnson Space Center. 
 
[00:56:06.926] 
This would be on both sides the 
contractor and the NASA side. 
 
[00:56:12.166] 
Probably one of the hardest 
things to do is to stand 
 
[00:56:16.926] 
up in front of a panel of 
experts, perhaps a dozen or so, 
 
[00:56:21.176] 
selected by the National 
Research Council 
 
[00:56:23.996] 
to scrutinize what you're going 
to tell them the limit ought 
 
[00:56:26.836] 
to be for benzene 
or carbon monoxide 
 
[00:56:30.906] 
or carbon dioxide 
for that matter. 
 
[00:56:34.656] 
Survey the literature and 
defend what you've concluded. 
 
[00:56:38.076] 
And I can tell you that over 
the years I've gotten a lot 
 
[00:56:40.186] 
of respect for my colleagues 
for being willing to do that, 
 
[00:56:43.916] 
to not be battered down if 
you will by multiple spears 
 
[00:56:49.866] 
that come from experts and 
to weather the storm and come 
 
[00:56:54.526] 
out on the other 
end and have limits 
 
[00:56:56.966] 
that I think we can 
be fully proud of. 
 
[00:56:59.726] 
And those limits 
have been developed 
 
[00:57:01.036] 
for air and water both. 
 
[00:57:03.726] 
We've made some great 
relationships 
 
[00:57:06.236] 
with really world 
class toxicologists 
 
[00:57:08.856] 
because of this involvement 
 
[00:57:10.866] 
but I've also gained a hearty 
respect for the ability 
 
[00:57:14.606] 
of my colleagues to go do this. 
 
[00:57:17.346] 
In terms of mission support, 
 
[00:57:19.076] 
it's probably declined a little 
bit over the past few years. 
 
[00:57:22.176] 
We've actually tried to 
put more tools in the hands 
 
[00:57:24.446] 
of the BME insurgent than 
we had, let's say in the 90s 
 
[00:57:27.556] 
with the Shuttle program 
and that's worked okay. 
 
[00:57:30.896] 
But every once in a while we 
catch the BMEs maybe making a 
 
[00:57:33.896] 
decision that they should have 
called us about but we worked 
 
[00:57:38.446] 
that as the case by case goes. 
 
[00:57:40.936] 
So, it's really been an honor 
to work with these people. 
 
[00:57:44.916] 
>> Lets look at this real 
quickly or briefly in the future 
 
[00:57:49.416] 
and what do you think the future 
might be for toxicology and kind 
 
[00:57:54.356] 
of help you out a 
little bit in order 
 
[00:58:00.076] 
[00:58:02.896] 
to meet your challenges 
(inaudible)? 
 
[00:58:06.736] 
>> You're gonna pick my whole 
brain (laughter) alright you 
 
[00:58:08.406] 
go-- are you gonna 
fire me or something? 
 
[00:58:11.996] 
( Laughter ) 
 
[00:58:12.063] 
>> You will know 
everything I know pretty soon 
 [00:58:13.786] 
and then now you 
wouldn't even need me. 
 
[00:58:15.516] 
( Laughter ) 
 
[00:58:20.516] 
>> That's a very good question. 
 
[00:58:22.326] 
Of course, the vision of where 
we're going is not exactly 
 
[00:58:25.796] 
focused but if we are to go 
to either a near-Earth object 
 
[00:58:31.776] 
or another distant object, let's 
say Mars or even a moon of Mars. 
 
[00:58:38.986] 
We're gonna have to deal 
with the environment there 
 
[00:58:40.786] 
and that's something unique 
that we haven't had to deal 
 
[00:58:43.036] 
with in toxicology because the-- 
 
[00:58:45.536] 
we bring the pollutants 
with us in these vehicles. 
 
[00:58:47.936] 
But when we get to the 
surface of Mars or the Moon 
 
[00:58:51.816] 
or an asteroid we're 
gonna encounter dust 
 
[00:58:55.506] 
of a very unusual nature there. 
 
[00:58:57.026] 
And we're gonna have 
to understand how 
 
[00:58:58.396] 
that dust affects not only 
human health because unvariably, 
 
[00:59:01.606] 
some of it is gonna get 
back in the habitat, 
 
[00:59:04.006] 
but also how it affects 
hardware. 
 
[00:59:05.476] 
That's one of the challenges. 
 
[00:59:07.976] 
If you're gonna go even to 
the Moon and stay a while, 
 
[00:59:10.616] 
you're going to have in 
situ-analytical capabilities. 
 [00:59:14.536] 
You're not gonna be bringing 
samples like this back. 
 
[00:59:16.836] 
It isn't gonna happen. 
 
[00:59:18.106] 
You're not gonna bring 
back formaldehyde badges. 
 
[00:59:20.316] 
You're gonna have to have a way 
to do that where the habitat is 
 
[00:59:23.906] 
and where the crew is living. 
 
[00:59:25.756] 
And that is going to 
be a real challenge, 
 
[00:59:27.546] 
making exceptionally 
good, reliable, 
 
[00:59:31.596] 
low-powered analytical 
instruments 
 
[00:59:33.796] 
that will withstand 
the mission of two 
 
[00:59:35.336] 
or three years is not easy. 
 
[00:59:38.086] 
Nobody does that yet, nobody. 
 
[00:59:40.936] 
I think in the next five to 10 
years, we will be able to do 
 
[00:59:45.106] 
that with a lot of confidence. 
 
[00:59:47.816] 
Miniaturization is 
happening all the time 
 
[00:59:49.866] 
with analytical instruments. 
 
[00:59:51.786] 
And there are some 
promising devices out there 
 
[00:59:54.926] 
that have a lot of capability. 
 
[00:59:57.066] 
The other thing we have to work 
 
[00:59:58.306] 
on is how the data are 
presented to the crew. 
 
[01:00:01.646] 
>> They're not gonna go 
around reading spectrograms 
 
[01:00:04.846] 
or complex panels 
and tables of data. 
 
[01:00:08.396] 
We're gonna have to 
present this to them 
 
[01:00:09.906] 
in a very straightforward way. 
 
[01:00:12.856] 
And one thing I've imagined, 
and I think we could do it, 
 
[01:00:16.196] 
is to present the crew-- let's 
say data on volatile organics 
 
[01:00:20.406] 
that would say, okay, here's the 
risk, that you might have eye 
 
[01:00:23.546] 
and nose irritation because 
of the pollutants we see 
 
[01:00:26.936] 
in the air. 
 
[01:00:27.716] 
And the risk is below 
some threshold or above. 
 
[01:00:30.796] 
Or here's the risk that you 
might have too many simple 
 
[01:00:36.846] 
nervous system depressants like 
alcohols and so on in the air. 
 
[01:00:41.116] 
If you're experiencing 
some of these symptoms, 
 
[01:00:43.746] 
you might wanna look at 
your analyzer and see 
 
[01:00:45.726] 
if it's telling you 
that there's too many 
 
[01:00:47.326] 
of these compounds in the air. 
 
[01:00:49.156] 
But it needs to be 
presented in a very simple way 
 
[01:00:51.476] 
that the crew can 
understand and use 
 
[01:00:54.116] 
to diagnose what's 
going on in the vehicle. 
 
[01:00:57.796] 
And so, there are 
plenty of challenges 
 
[01:00:59.536] 
in terms of setting limits. 
 
[01:01:04.366] 
There are so many toxicologists 
around you could argue 
 
[01:01:08.076] 
that they're constantly 
devising new ways 
 
[01:01:11.246] 
to set presumably better 
limits and of course, 
 
[01:01:14.026] 
new data are coming along all 
the time with the compounds 
 
[01:01:17.456] 
that we're interested in. 
 
[01:01:18.666] 
So probably, every 5 to 10 
years, we need to read these 
 
[01:01:22.186] 
at the limits we've 
got already and see 
 [01:01:23.826] 
if they need to be refined. 
 
[01:01:25.816] 
And in fact, I'm planning in 
2012 to restart the effort 
 
[01:01:29.426] 
that we stopped a few years ago 
 
[01:01:31.286] 
with the National 
Research Council. 
 
[01:01:33.066] 
Although we may use a different 
body but limits have to be kept 
 
[01:01:37.086] 
up to date, limits that are 
10 years older are too old. 
 
[01:01:40.276] 
There're too many 
things changing. 
 
[01:01:42.786] 
So, it's-- what's going to 
go away is archival sampling. 
 
[01:01:50.696] 
You know, one day we're gonna 
be on the Moon or we're gonna be 
 
[01:01:52.776] 
on an asteroid somewhere 
 
[01:01:53.996] 
and there's not gonna be huge 
GC mass spectrometers back 
 
[01:01:58.386] 
in the lab to do samples. 
 
[01:01:59.836] 
We won't be doing it that way. 
 
[01:02:01.446] 
And now, we guess that 
will probably in-- 
 
[01:02:04.436] 
ISS ends which is either 2020 
 
[01:02:07.466] 
or 2028 we could keep it 
functioning that long. 
 
[01:02:13.486] 
So, there is the vision. 
 
[01:02:14.806] 
>> So, what are some of 
the promising technologies 
 
[01:02:17.406] 
that you have out there at the-- 
 
[01:02:21.296] 
>> Okay. 
 
[01:02:22.246] 
( Inaudible Remark ) 
 
[01:02:26.116] 
>> There's-- some of my 
colleagues would argue 
 
[01:02:30.246] 
that there are optical 
techniques 
 
[01:02:32.226] 
that will do a better job of 
monitoring combustions product 
 
[01:02:35.066] 
than electrochemical sensors. 
 
[01:02:36.816] 
And as I said, electrochemical 
sensors have their 
 
[01:02:39.256] 
idiosyncrasies and 
sometimes it even matters 
 
[01:02:42.696] 
who is building the 
back the company. 
 
[01:02:44.386] 
If there-- there's a bit of 
what I call the witchcraft 
 
[01:02:46.926] 
to building those things. 
 
[01:02:48.016] 
And it's-- if the craftsman 
changes, the sensors change. 
 
[01:02:53.396] 
Optical techniques are 
a little more robust. 
 
[01:02:55.846] 
Unfortunately, the optical 
monitors I've seen are 
 
[01:02:58.526] 
about four or five 
times as big as this 
 
[01:03:00.456] 
to do one or two compounds. 
 
[01:03:02.156] 
That's gonna be too big. 
 
[01:03:03.056] 
They're gonna have to shrink. 
 
[01:03:03.996] 
And as for combustion products, 
we are gonna have a panel 
 
[01:03:07.546] 
in a few months to go 
over all the technologies 
 
[01:03:09.526] 
with outside experts and 
see what we've missed 
 
[01:03:11.956] 
and see what's most promising. 
 
[01:03:13.136] 
In terms of volatile organics, 
 
[01:03:16.296] 
[01:03:17.516] 
we do fly a gas comatograph 
a differential mobility 
 
[01:03:21.136] 
spectrometer that I think 
shows a lot of promise. 
 
[01:03:24.876] 
It could miniaturized 
even further. 
 
[01:03:26.876] 
I've seen a handheld instrument. 
 
[01:03:28.606] 
Well, the one we fly now 
is maybe about as big 
 
[01:03:30.476] 
as this thing-- are 
going to fly, 
 [01:03:33.036] 
its government furnished 
equipment. 
 
[01:03:34.806] 
It's gonna have a little screen 
on it that will communicate 
 
[01:03:37.736] 
to the crew if any 
of the pollutants are 
 
[01:03:39.006] 
out of line and so on. 
 
[01:03:40.716] 
But I've seen one that the 
company is building that's a 
 
[01:03:47.076] 
fifth maybe an eighth 
of that size, 
 
[01:03:49.936] 
a really handheld 
volatile organics analyzer. 
 
[01:03:54.056] 
Will these be reliable enough? 
 
[01:03:56.426] 
I don't know, experience 
will tell us. 
 
[01:03:59.026] 
GC mass spectrometry, 
 
[01:04:00.996] 
very powerful technique although 
the thing people forget is 
 
[01:04:06.246] 
that it's sometimes blind 
to important compounds. 
 
[01:04:11.446] 
GC mass spectrometers 
are not the see all 
 
[01:04:14.796] 
and end all of everything. 
 
[01:04:16.436] 
They are complex, 
they are fickle 
 
[01:04:18.626] 
and they can be a 
challenge I think to make 
 
[01:04:22.106] 
in a reliable and 
dependable way. 
 
[01:04:25.316] 
[01:04:27.496] 
There are other techniques 
that might be useful. 
 
[01:04:34.996] 
Some people have 
built a membrane inlet 
 
[01:04:37.906] 
mass spectrometer. 
 
[01:04:39.446] 
Now, these mass spectrometers 
tend to be simpler 
 
[01:04:42.746] 
than the more complex ones 
 
[01:04:44.106] 
that are behind a gas 
comatograph column 
 
[01:04:49.006] 
and they show some promise. 
 
[01:04:51.896] 
The issue is what the membrane 
will let in and what it won't 
 
[01:04:56.436] 
and what happens to the 
membrane if it gets a high dose 
 
[01:04:58.906] 
of some compound action 
will in the membrane 
 
[01:05:01.816] 
and then the mass spectrometer 
fails because it gets overdosed 
 
[01:05:05.636] 
on a compound that was 
not meant for that. 
 
[01:05:11.236] 
There is an optical technique 
called Fourier Transform 
 
[01:05:15.346] 
Infrared Spectrometry that 
has been used by the Europeans 
 
[01:05:20.506] 
to fly a rather large 
instrument on Station. 
 
[01:05:24.056] 
[01:05:25.086] 
It gets the spectrum of 
everything in the air 
 
[01:05:29.906] 
that exhibits an FTI or spectrum 
and then deconvolutes those. 
 
[01:05:34.876] 
I think it was moderately 
successful 
 
[01:05:37.076] 
when it flew on Station. 
 
[01:05:39.036] 
There were some surprises to the 
group but they were able to fair 
 
[01:05:42.456] 
out those surprises and figure 
out for example that one 
 
[01:05:45.076] 
of the compounds that they were 
seeing was a compound that leaks 
 [01:05:49.016] 
from the Russian Service 
Module air conditioning system. 
 
[01:05:53.926] 
I suppose you could argue there 
is a bit of witchcraft there. 
 
[01:05:59.026] 
To my knowledge, there are 
maybe one or two individuals 
 
[01:06:01.556] 
in the world that can 
deconvolute the spectra 
 
[01:06:05.116] 
and make sense of them. 
 
[01:06:06.906] 
That's not good. 
 
[01:06:08.946] 
That in fact, that's always 
an issue with ground-based 
 
[01:06:13.946] 
or instruments that are gonna 
fly on-- in near-earth orbit. 
 
[01:06:17.646] 
Do you have the people 
on the ground 
 
[01:06:19.556] 
to sustain those 
instruments and deal 
 
[01:06:22.546] 
with whatever analysis 
they produce? 
 
[01:06:25.666] 
And that can be a question, if 
you have a company build it. 
 
[01:06:29.676] 
If the company fails, 
you're sunk. 
 [01:06:32.586] 
If you have an exotic team at 
some high-level lab build it, 
 
[01:06:37.476] 
is that team gonna exist 
three years from now 
 
[01:06:39.636] 
when your instruments 
are giving you fits. 
 
[01:06:43.616] 
There are a lot of 
questions with how 
 
[01:06:44.826] 
to sustain these things. 
 
[01:06:47.146] 
So anyway, that's kind 
 
[01:06:48.536] 
of a toxicologist 
survey of techniques. 
 
[01:06:52.816] 
 
[01:06:54.830] 
 
The video is currently secured in the following temporary area for ease of viewing, but will be 
moved eventually.   
http://sd.jsc.nasa.gov/doclib/sa/sf/Educational_Series/SF_Discipline_Videos/Shuttle_Exp_Space
_Toxicology.wmv  
 
 
